​Jonah PB Goldwater

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"Uploads, Faxes, and You: Why Personal Identity is Non-Transferable"

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       (Forthcoming). American Philosophical Quarterly.

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       You can be faxed only if you're an abstract object, so you can be uploaded only if you're an                      abstract object. So Chalmers' argument for 'gradual uploading' fails.

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"Freedom and Actual Interference"

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       (Forthcoming). The Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.

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       Liberal or noninterference conceptions of freedom do indeed have the resources to explain what          proponents of republican or non-dominination conceptions of freedom claim they cannot.

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"Six Arguments Against 'Ought Implies Can'"

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       (Forthcoming). Southwest Philosophy Review 36 (1), 2020.

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       I present six arguments against 'OIC' that only invoke general principles; no cases. 

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"How Many There Are Isn't"

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       (Forthcoming). Philosophia.

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       How many things exist can be genuinely, metaphysically, indeterminate- contra the orthodox view.        Upshot: the 'are there n or n+1 things?' approach to metaphysics is likely misguided.

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“The Lump and the Ledger: Material Coincidence At Little-to-No-Cost” 

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       (Forthcoming). Erkenntnis.

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       I defend a number of methodological theses regarding cost-benefit tradeoffs in metaphysical                theory choice. I also explain why it’s fine if the statue and the clay coincide. 

 

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"The Physical as the Nomalous"

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       (2019). The Journal of Consciousness Studies, 26 (5–6): 65–88. 

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       I defend a new conception of physicalism as true iff all events are law-governed. Free will—not              consciousness—is likely the crux. 

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"Ryle, the Double Counting Problem, and the Logical Form of Category Mistakes"

         

       (2018). Journal of the History of Philosophy, 56 (2): 337–359.    

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       Category mistakes are not only mistakes of predication. They are also mistakes of conjunction                and quantification. Big restrictions on ontology follow. 

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"Physicalism and the Sortalist Conception of Objects"                                                           
         

       (2018). Synthese, 195 (12): 5497–5519.​

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       Physicalism is incompatible with the (neo)Aristotelian metaphysics of objects- in particular its                kind-based essentialism. The physicalist picture is likely Heraclitean instead.   

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"Authority and Natural Kind Essence"

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       (2018). Axiomathes, 28 (1): 1–12.

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       Water may be H2O, but the essence of water being H2O is conventional or trivial- and likely                      dictated by authority. 

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"Existence and Strong Uncountability"

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       (2017). Acta Analytica, 32 (3): 321–331.

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       Existence is standardly understood in terms of number: for something to exist is for one                          thing to exist. I argue this is a mistake. A revisionary reading of quantification follows. 

 

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"No Composition, No Problem: Ordinary Objects as Arrangements"

        

       (2015). Philosophia, 43 (2): 367-379.

 

       Tables and chairs exist- even if atoms arranged table- and chair-wise don't compose wholes. For            tables and chairs are whatever you're sitting on- even if that's just an arrangements of atoms! 

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"Sider's Third Realm"
 

       (2014). Metaphysica: International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics, 15 (1): 99–112.  

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       Taking quantifiers and connectives to carve at nature's joints undercuts the ontology/ideology                distinction, and requires an exotic form of logical realism. Despite Sider's claims to the contrary​​​​.

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